A public inquiry into the devastating 2017 London Grenfell Tower blaze that killed 72 people blamed the disaster on failings by the government, construction industry and, most of all, the firms involved in fitting the exterior with flammable cladding.

The fire ripped through the 23-storey social housing block in one of London's richest areas during the early hours of June 14, 2017. It was Britain's deadliest blaze in a residential building since World War Two.

"The simple truth is that the deaths that occurred were all avoidable," said inquiry chair Martin Moore-Bick.

In its long-awaited final report, the inquiry laid most responsibility for the disaster on the companies involved in the maintenance and refit of the apartment tower, as well as companies that it said had dishonestly marketed combustible cladding materials as safe.

It also criticized the then-government, the local authority of Kensington and Chelsea, the industry, regulatory groups, specific individuals and an ill-prepared fire brigade for years of inaction over fire safety in high-rise blocks.

London residential block catches fire on day of Grenfell report. – Reuters

"Not all of them bear the same degree of responsibility for the eventual disaster, but as our reports show, all contributed to it in one way or another, in most cases, through incompetence, but in some cases, through dishonesty and greed," Moore-Bick said.

The inquiry report, which ran to almost 1700 pages, said the inferno was the culmination of "decades of failure", with profits put before people.

"The duty of government should be to safeguard life, whilst protecting us from corporate greed," said Grenfell United, a group representing some survivors and bereaved families.

"But for too long, they have aided corporations, facilitating them to profit and dictate regulation."

Prime Minister Keir Starmer apologised to the relatives of victims and survivors on behalf of the British state, saying they had been failed for years.

"It should never have happened. The country failed to discharge its most fundamental duty, to protect you and your loved ones," he said in parliament, where some bereaved relatives watched on. 

"Today is a long awaited day of truth, but it must now lead to a day of justice."

British police have said 58 people and 19 firms and organisations are under investigation. However, any prosecutions - including for corporate manslaughter and fraud - remain years away because of the complexity and need to consider the inquiry's report.

"It (the inquiry) has delayed the justice my family deserves," said 46-year-old Hisam Choucair, who lost his mother, sister, his brother-in-law and three young nieces in the fire.

Fridge fire

An earlier report by the inquiry team in 2019, which focused on the events of the night, found an electrical fault in a refrigerator in a fourth-floor apartment started the fire.

Flames then spread uncontrollably, mainly because the tower had been covered during a 2016 refurbishment with cladding - exterior panels designed to improve appearance and add insulation - made of flammable aluminium composite material that acted as a source of fuel.

Footage from the 2017 London Grenfell Tower blaze  – Reuters

The harrowing accounts, including recordings from those who perished while awaiting rescuers and having followed official guidance to stay put, prompted fury and national soul-searching over building standards and the treatment of low-income communities.

The inquiry, headed by Moore-Bick, a retired judge, found a litany of failings, saying lessons had not been learned from past high-rise tower blazes and testing systems were inadequate.

People hold up photos of their loved ones, victims of the Grenfell Tower fire, at a memorial service in London. – AP

The most overt blame was laid at the feet of those involved in the refurbishment of the tower with the flammable cladding. The inquiry said architect Studio E, principal contractor Rydon, and cladding sub-contractor Harley all bore considerable responsibility for the disaster.

Fire safety inspectors Exova were also blamed for the building being left "in a dangerous condition on completion of the refurbishment".

Both Kensington and Chelsea council and the Tenant Management Organisation (TMO), which managed the local authority's housing stock, were also heavily criticised.

People write messages on a wall for the victims of the Grenfell Tower fire. – AP

The inquiry said they had shown indifference to fire safety regulations in the years before the blaze and that the TMO, whose difficult relationship with some residents was said to have created a "toxic atmosphere", had been unduly focused on cutting costs.

While the local community and voluntary groups were praised for providing support, the council was also criticised for its slow, muddled and "wholly inadequate" response to the incident. The council's leader said it accepted the findings and apologised.

There was also condemnation of those firms which made and sold the cladding or its foam insulation - Celotex, Kingspan, and Arconic Architectural Products, the French subsidiary of US company Arconic. The inquiry concluded there had been "systematic dishonesty" on their part.

"They engaged in deliberate and sustained strategies to manipulate the testing processes, misrepresent tested data and mislead the market," the report said.

Arconic said it rejected any claim it had sold an unsafe product or tried to conceal information about tests of its materials. Kingspan said it had "long acknowledged the wholly unacceptable historical failings" but said these did not cause the tragedy.

The issue of exterior cladding has raised concerns across Europe where there have been similar blazes in apartment blocks such as in the Spanish city of Valencia in February, and in Italy in 2021.

In Britain, government figures from July showed 3280 buildings standing at 11 metres (36 feet) or higher still had unsafe cladding, with remediation work yet to start on more than two-thirds of them.

An official works in the burnt out remains of the Grenfell Tower residential building in London on September 20, 2017. – Reuters

Who is to blame for deadly 2017 Grenfell Tower fire?

A public inquiry into the devastating 2017 London Grenfell Tower blaze concluded on Wednesday that a "culmination of decades of failure" by the government and the construction industry ultimately led to the disaster that killed 72 people.

The report detailed how the government, council, architects, contractors, local council and management firms involved in refitting the exterior with flammable cladding bear much of the blame for what happened seven years ago.

The government 

The report said the government, which at the time was led by former Conservative prime minister Theresa May, had "many opportunities" over the years to identify the risks posed by the use of combustible cladding and insulation in high-rise buildings, had ignored numerous warnings and failed to act.

In 2001, the government failed to pay due regard to the "striking results" of a large-scale test involving flammable cladding and failed to communicate the dangers to industry.

Following a 2009 blaze at Lakanal House, another high-rise block in south London, the government's thinking was so focused on deregulation that it ignored or delayed matters affecting the safety of life, the report said.

Inquiry chair Martin Moore-Bick said previous governments and others failed to amend guidance on the construction of external walls: "That is where the seeds of the disaster were sown."

Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) 

The wealthy Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC), the local authority, failed to scrutinise the design or choice of materials and ensure that on completion of the refurbishment work the building complied with building requirements.

"It (RBKC) therefore bears considerable responsibility for the dangerous conditions of the building immediately on the completion of the work," the report said.

The response by RBKC and the central government to the Grenfell fire and the needs of victims was "muddled, slow, indecisive and piecemeal", sometimes demonstrating a "marked lack of respect for human decency and dignity".

Many victims were left feeling abandoned by authorities and utterly helpless, with their only support from volunteers.

Elizabeth Campbell, leader of the Kensington and Chelsea Council, apologised "unreservedly" for "our failure to listen to residents and to protect them".

"We fully accept the findings, which are a withering critique of a system broken from top to bottom. It is crystal clear – profits were put before people, clear warning signs were ignored, and Grenfell was wholly avoidable, with failure at every single level," Campbell said in a statement.

Tenant Management Organisation (TMO)

The Tenant Management Organisation (TMO), the public body exercising control over the building, and RBKC were jointly responsible for the management of fire safety at Grenfell Tower.

The report said TMO wanted to reduce the cost of the tower's refurbishment by using ACM panels and must also bear responsibility for the disaster. It failed to take sufficient care in its choice of architect and on matters of fire safety.

The firms

A significant reason why Grenfell Tower came to be clad in combustible insulation and aluminium composite materials (ACM) panels was the "systematic dishonesty" by an array of companies, the report said, adding some manipulated testing processes, misrepresented tested data and mislead the market.

The French subsidiary of the American company Arconic manufactured and sold the ACM cladding, and from 2005 until after the fire "deliberately concealed from the market the true extent of the danger" of such cladding.

In response to the report, Arconic said its product was safe and legal, and that it regularly tested its materials. It said it did not conceal information or mislead any certification body, customer or the public.

Arconic said its subsidiary cooperated fully with the work of the inquiry.

Celotex and Kingspan, which made the foam insulation, are also to blame, the report said.

In a bid to break into the insulation market for high-rise buildings, Celotex "embarked on a dishonest scheme to mislead its customers and the wider market".

Kingspan sold insulation that was not suitable for external use in high-rise buildings.

Kingspan said in statement that the type of insulation was immaterial and the principal reason for the spread of the fire was the ACM cladding, which was not made by Kingspan.

"Kingspan has long acknowledged the wholly unacceptable historical failings that occurred in part of our UK insulation business. These were in no way reflective of how we conduct ourselves as a group, then or now," it said.

Architects and other contractors 

None of those involved in the design of the external walls or the choice of materials, such as architectural firm Studio E, "acted in accordance with the standards of a reasonably competent person in their position", the report said.

Studio E, responsible for the design of the external walls and the choice of materials, had wanted to use zinc rainscreen panels but the ACM version was chosen largely on cost grounds.

Construction contractor Rydon was able to offer a substantial saving due its relationship with the cladding subcontractor Harley. The inquiry said all three took a casual approach to contractual relations.

Harley, the report said, did not concern itself sufficiently with fire safety at any stage of the refurbishment.

Studio E demonstrated a "cavalier attitude" to fire safety regulations and Rydon and Harley relied on their previous experience rather than on any technical analysis or expertise.

Fire safety inspectors Exova were instructed by Studio E, on behalf of the TMO, to prepare a fire safety strategy for Grenfell but although a draft was prepared, it was never completed.

London Fire Brigade (LFB) 

After the fatal fire at Lakanal House, the London Fire Brigade (LFB) should have been "alerted" to the "shortcomings of its own ability to fight fires in high-rise buildings", the report said. LFB also should have made better use of the knowledge it gained.

The LFB, the report said, was ill prepared to deal with Grenfell for several reasons, such as a "chronic lack of effective management and leadership" and the "unfounded assumption" that pre-existing building regulations were sufficient.

Other bodies named in the report 

The Building Research Establishment played an important role in enabling Celotex and Kingspan to market their insulation products for use in the external walls of high-rise buildings, while the National House Building Council failed to ensure its building control function remained "free of commercial pressures".

A resident in a nearby building watches smoke rise from the Grenfell Tower building in 2017. – Reuters

Timeline of Grenfell Tower fire 

Here is a summary of how the disaster evolved and what happened after the flames were extinguished:

June 14, 2017

At 12:54am, a call is made to the London Fire Brigade reporting that a fire has broken out in a fourth-floor apartment at Grenfell Tower. Barely half an hour later, flames have swirled to the roof of the building.

The fire's rapid spread is quickly blamed on flammable cladding made of aluminum composite material (ACM), which had recently been installed as part of a building refurbishment.

Survivors also question why people were told to remain in their apartments as fire engulfed the building.

June 15, 2017

Then-prime minister Theresa May announces a public inquiry into the fire. Martin Moore-Bick, a retired court of appeal judge, is appointed to lead the inquiry two weeks later.

July 28, 2017

Judith Hackitt, a chemical engineer and former chair of Britain's national workplace safety regulatory, is appointed to conduct review of building regulations.

September 19, 2017

London's Metropolitan Police widens its criminal investigation into the fire, with detectives considering individual as well as corporate manslaughter charges.

November 30, 2017

A petition, backed by singer Adele, urges May to expand the Grenfell inquiry panel because of concerns that Moore-Bick lacked first-hand experience of life as a social tenant in a multicultural neighbourhood.

January 29, 2018

Maria del Pilar Burton, a 74-year-old survivor, dies in palliative care. She is considered the 72nd victim of the fire.

May 17, 2018

Hackitt recommends "fundamental reform" of fire safety rules in a report that describes a "race to the bottom" on building safety as building owners put the drive to save money ahead of safety.

May 21, 2018

The inquiry begins with seven days of hearings commemorating the dead, starting with a tribute to the fire's youngest victim, stillborn Logan Gomes.

June 14, 2018

A year after the fire, survivors and bereaved relatives gather to lay white roses at the foot of Grenfell Tower. They are joined by rapper Stormzy, a London native who supported the residents' drive for better representation at the inquiry. 

Across the country, people observe 72 seconds of silence in memory of the victims.

June 21, 2018

Firefighters begin giving evidence to the inquiry. London Fire Brigade Commissioner Dany Cotton tells the inquiry she would change nothing about her team's response on the night of the fire. Survivors react with anger.

September 30, 2018

The British government bans combustible cladding on all residential buildings above 18 metres (59 feet), as well as schools, care homes, student accommodation and hospitals.

June 18, 2019

Survivors and bereaved families project a message on to the Houses of Parliament reading: "Two years after Grenfell, this building still hasn't kept its promises #DemandChange."

October 30, 2019

The inquiry releases its report on the first phase of its investigation. It attributes the rapid spread of flames to ACM panels with polyethylene cores, "which acted as a source of fuel".

It also criticized the London Fire Brigade for allowing a "stay in place" order to remain in effect even after it became clear safety systems were failing, leading to an increased loss of life.

The report's recommendations include calls for legislation to require evacuation plans for all high-rise residential buildings, more frequent inspections of elevators and fire doors, better training for firefighters and improved communication among emergency responders.

November 6, 2019

Jacob Rees-Mogg, then the leader of the House of Commons, apologises for suggesting Grenfell victims should have used "common sense" and ignored fire service guidance not to leave their apartments.

February 24, 2020

Campaigners urge the government to create a multibillion-pound fund to replace dangerous cladding after research suggests that more than half a million people could be living in unsafe homes. The Association of Residential Managing Agents said that while Grenfell highlighted the dangers of ACM cladding, it also revealed a much wider building safety crisis.

March 11, 2020

Rishi Sunak, then chancellor, creates a  £1 billion fund to remove unsafe cladding from high-rise residential buildings.

January 19, 2021

The government promises to create a new regulator to improve the safety of building materials after the Grenfell inquiry had "shone a light" on dishonest practices by some manufacturers, including "deliberate attempts to game the system and rig the results of safety tests".

February 10, 2021

Robert Jenrick, then housing secretary, announces a new £3.5 billion package to pay for the removal of unsafe cladding from medium- and high-rise buildings. Critics say the program doesn't do enough to address the problems of people who bought apartments in unsafe buildings and are now unable to sell because of delays in addressing fire safety issues.

June 14, 2022

Prince William and British politicians join in memorial services to mark five years since the fire. Some say Grenfell families feel "abandoned" after half a decade of "betrayal" by the housing department and slow progress on safety improvements.

May 2024

London's Metropolitan Police Service confirms that bereaved families and survivors may have to wait until the end of 2026 for a decision on potential criminal charges. The Met says police won't complete their investigation until the end of 2025, and prosecutors are likely to need another year to determine whether any charges will be brought.

July 2024

Government figures show the slow pace of removing dangerous cladding from buildings in England. While authorities have identified 4630 residential buildings of 11 metres (36 feet) or more that have unsafe cladding, only around half (2299) have either started or completed remediation works. Less than a third (1350) have completed the work.

August 26, 2024

A huge fire at an apartment building in east London reminds people of the dangers of combustible cladding. While no one died in the fire, more than 80 residents were evacuated from the six-storey building where contractors were removing "non-compliant" cladding.

September 4, 2024

Final report of the Grenfell Inquiry is published.